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TITLE IX AND OFFICIAL POLICY LIABILITY:
MAXIMIZING THE LAW’S POTENTIAL TO HOLD
EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR
THEIR RESPONSES TO SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
ERIN E. BUZUVIS
Introduction
Title IX, the federal statute that prohibits sex discrimination in education,
plays a key role in institutional accountability for sexual misconduct that is
perpetrated by a school’s students, faculty, and staff. 1 The Supreme Court
has confirmed that Title IX includes an implied right of action for money
damages when the institution had actual notice that sexual harassment had
occurred, or was likely to occur, and responded to that threat with deliberate
indifference. 2 But the deliberate indifference standard has proven to be a
high and unpredictable bar for plaintiffs. For this reason, many institutions
required the threat of government enforcement—issued in the form of the
Department of Education’s 2011 “Dear Colleague Letter” 3—to begin to
address and improve their policies and practices for preventing and
responding to sexual misconduct.
Recently, however, the Department of Education has incorporated the
judicial deliberate indifference standard into its own regulations for
enforcing Title IX.4 As a result, both judicial and administrative
enforcement of Title IX may soon converge into the same generous
standard that puts very little pressure on institutions to proactively or
reactively respond to sexual misconduct on their campuses and in their
communities. By responding only minimally to sexual misconduct, an
institution can easily avoid committing deliberate indifference, while at the
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Western New England
University School of Law.
1. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2018).
2. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998) (citing
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60 (1992)).
3. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
(Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf
[hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].
4. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30026, 30045–46, 30574 (final rule
published May 19, 2020, effective Aug. 14, 2020) (codified at 34 C.F.R. 106.44(a)).
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same time steering clear of the ever-present threat of litigation by
respondents and individuals disciplined for sexual misconduct.
In light of this concern about unidirectional litigation pressure, this
Article seeks to highlight a lesser-known Title IX theory of liability with
the potential to promote institutional accountability for sexual misconduct:
official policy liability. Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder was the
first case to recognize that educational institutions are liable under Title IX
not only for indifferent response to the sexual misconduct of those under
their control but also for sexual misconduct caused by their official
policies.5 But this alternative theory of liability has not been widely utilized
by plaintiffs’ lawyers, and the majority of judicial decisions that have
considered it have found it not to apply. 6
Recently, however, two lower courts have countered this trend by
denying motions to dismiss claims of official policy liability against both
Baylor University7 and the University of Tennessee. 8 In both cases,
plaintiffs sought damages for sexual assault experienced at the hands of
other students and claimed that their universities’ official policies of
indifference to sexual misconduct caused the assault.9
Part I of this Article provides background on Title IX and judicial
enforcement under the more well-known deliberate indifference standard
5. See 500 F.3d 1170, 1182–85 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Wes R. McCart, Note,
Simpson v. University of Colorado: Title IX Crashes the Party in College Athletic
Recruiting, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 153, 166 (2008) (“At the same time, the court’s decision
reinterpreted Title IX liability for sexual harassment by allowing for damages when the
substantive violation is the proximate result of an educational institution’s official policy. In
doing so, the Tenth Circuit claims to have abandoned the Gebser and Davis precedent
regarding actual notice standards in favor of the liability standard . . . .”) (footnotes omitted).
6. See infra Section III.D.1.
7. Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 662 n.7 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“Because
the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden under the official-policy rubric, it does
not evaluate this category of claims under the actual notice and deliberate indifference
framework articulated in Gebser and Davis.”).
8. Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 804–08, 815–16 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).
Specifically, in this case, the Middle District of Tennessee commented that it was
not aware of any case before the Sixth Circuit where Title IX liability for thirdparty acts has been premised on an official policy of the funding recipient,
rather than on actual knowledge and deliberate indifference to known acts of
harassment, [yet] the court [found] that Gebser and Davis could support such a
theory.
Id. at 804–05.
9. Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 653–56; Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 791–92.
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developed in Gebser and Davis. Part II contrasts the standard of liability
under deliberate indifference with that under official policy liability.
Additionally, Part II traces the evolution of official policy liability from
Simpson through the recent cases against Tennessee and Baylor. Finally,
Part III explores the potential of official policy liability as a tool for
maximizing Title IX’s potential to promote institutional accountability,
even in an era characterized by lax regulatory enforcement and litigious
respondents.
I. Institutional Liability Under Title IX
Title IX is a federal civil rights statute that prohibits educational
institutions that receive money from the federal government from
discriminating on the basis of sex.10 While the statute was originally aimed
at institutional policies that restricted women’s access to graduate and
professional school, modern judicial and regulatory interpretations have
clarified that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination within the
meaning of the law. 11 Sexual assault is an obvious subset of sexual
harassment because it is unwelcome and severe by definition, and because
it often has the effect of interfering with a victim’s educational
opportunities.12
A. Title IX’s Dual Enforcement Mechanisms
Title IX’s express statutory language contemplates administrative
enforcement to ensure that federal funding does not flow to institutions that

10. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
11. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998); Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–67 (1986) (ruling under Title VII that unwelcome
sexual advances, when sufficiently severe or pervasive to render a workplace environment
hostile to members of one sex); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977)
(“[A]cademic advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes [a
claim of] sex discrimination in education . . . .”), aff’d, 631 F.2d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1980); see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985) (including “unwelcome sexual advances” as actionable
harassment on the basis of sex under Title VII).
12. See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 274 n.12 (4th Cir. 2006)
(acknowledging that a single incident of sexual assault or rape could be sufficient to raise a
jury question about whether a hostile environment exists); Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845,
854–55 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that rape and sexual abuse “obviously qualif[y] as . . .
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive sexual harassment that could deprive [the
student] of access to the educational opportunities provided by her school”).
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discriminate on the basis of sex. 13 Though every federal agency that
administers federal funding to educational institutions is responsible for
ensuring taxpayer dollars are not used to subsidize discrimination, the
Department of Education (the “Department”) is the exemplar enforcement
agency.14 The Department investigates complaints of noncompliance and
conducts comprehensive investigations at its own initiative. 15 When the
Department determines that an institution has not complied with Title IX, as
interpreted by its implementing regulations and interpretive policies and
guidance, it gives institutions the opportunity to correct noncompliant
policies and practices, thereby avoiding penalties. 16 Only institutions that
fail to resolve compliance issues voluntarily risk losing their funding, which
occurs only after a formal hearing. 17 To date, however, the government has
never withdrawn federal funding from an educational institution over issues
of Title IX compliance. 18
In addition, the Supreme Court has confirmed that Congress intended an
implied private right of action that allows private litigants to supplement
administrative enforcement in an effort to ensure Title IX accountability for
educational institutions.19 This right of action allows plaintiffs to recover
money damages20 or to attain injunctive relief.21 But as a matter of fairness
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682(a).
14. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance; Final Common Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 52857, 52859
(Aug. 30, 2000) (“As set forth in this common rule, the substantive nondiscrimination
obligations of recipients, for the most part, are identical to those established by the
Department of Education (“ED”) under Title IX.”); see also Title IX and Sex Discrimination,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (rev. Apr. 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/tix_dis.html (noting that the Office for Civil Rights (a component of the U.S.
Department of Education) enforces Title IX).
15. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c) (2020).
16. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (incorporating 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8).
17. Id. (incorporating 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.8, 100.9).
18. In the early days of Title IX enforcement, some institutions resisted efforts of the
Department of Education’s predecessor agency, the Department of Health, Education &
Wellness, to apply Title IX beyond the specific program that had directly received the aid.
See Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX and Procedural Fairness: Why Disciplined-Student Litigation
Does Not Undermine the Role of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault, 78 MONT. L. REV. 71,
79 n.37 (2017). However, these institutions successfully invoked judicial review of agency
action in order to avoid funding withdrawal, though these judicial decisions have been
abrogated by subsequent amendments to Title IX. See id.
19. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 705–09 (1979).
20. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1992).
21. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285–86 (1998).
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to educational institutions, the Supreme Court has held that schools may
only be liable for their own intentional and unlawful conduct. 22
Moreover, courts cannot force institutions to pay damages on a theory of
vicarious liability or for accidental harm because Title IX is, at its core, a
spending statute.23 Title IX is essentially a bilateral agreement between
educational institutions and the federal government. According to that
agreement, the federal government agrees to provide funding, and the
recipients agree to the government’s terms and conditions—including the
condition not to engage in sex discrimination. 24
As between these two parties, the remedy for breach, then, is the
withdrawal of federal funds. Educational institutions arguably lack notice of
the fact that, by accepting federal funding from the government, they could
be liable to a “third party” such as a student or employee who experiences
sex discrimination in violation of Title IX. 25 But regulatory enforcement of
Title IX raises no such concern because notice is built into the enforcement
process. If an institution is ignorant of its obligation to comply with Title
IX, it will receive an opportunity to correct its actions before losing any
federal funds.26
Similarly, judicially imposed injunctions only apply on a prospective
basis and, therefore, avoid notice concerns. But with regard to money
damages, the Supreme Court has insisted that only an institution’s
intentional misconduct can give rise to such liability because, unlike
22. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642–43 (1999); Gebser, 524 U.S.
at 290 (“Consequently, in cases like this one that do not involve official policy of the
recipient entity, we hold that a damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official
who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute
corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the
recipient’s programs and fails adequately to respond.”).
23. Congress does not have plenary power to regulate educational institutions, but it
does have the power to appropriate federal funds. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. As an extension of
this power, Congress routinely imposes conditions that obligate the recipients of such
funding to comply with requirements that Congress would not necessarily have the power to
impose directly. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981) (“Unlike legislation enacted under § 5, however, legislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”).
24. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
25. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 641–42; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91; Franklin, 503 U.S. at
74–75.
26. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288 (discussing that the regulatory scheme requires notice
before imposing financial penalties).
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accidents or vicarious liability, intentional misconduct is entirely within the
institution’s power to prevent and control. 27 Therefore, to ensure that the
liability for damages does not sneak up on an unsuspecting funding
recipient, the remedy only applies to cases involving intentional
discrimination.
B. Judicial Enforcement and the Deliberate Indifference Standard
While money damages would appear to only apply in narrow cases, the
Court has expanded situations where a funding recipient is deemed to
intentionally discriminate. Significantly, in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District, the Supreme Court held that an institution’s
deliberate indifference to a known violation of Title IX is a form of
intentional discrimination that courts may remedy with money damages. 28
Later, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Supreme Court
articulated the necessary elements that a plaintiff must establish in cases
seeking money damages for student-on-student sexual harassment and
assault.29 Under the Gebser/Davis standard, a plaintiff must prove that (1)
an appropriate person, or someone with authority, had actual notice of
sexual harassment or sexual assault;30 (2) notwithstanding such notice, the
institution responded with deliberate indifference; and (3) the sexual
harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
effectively bar[red] the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or
benefit.”31
This deliberate indifference standard has proven difficult for plaintiffs to
satisfy for a number of reasons. First, the gold standard for actual notice is
that institutional officials knew that the perpetrator of sexual misconduct

27. Id. at 290.
28. Id. at 290–93.
29. Davis, 526 U.S. at 642–45.
30. Later courts have clarified that the notice may address an incident that had occurred,
was occurring, or was threatened. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477
F.3d 1282, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2007); Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“[H]arassment of persons other than the plaintiff may provide the school with the
requisite notice to impose liability under Title IX.”); Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 672
(7th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted) (“[I]n Davis the Court required knowledge only
of ‘acts of sexual harassment’ by the [harasser], not of previous acts directed against the
particular plaintiff.”), abrogated by Doe No. 55 v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 819
(7th Cir. 2018).
31. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
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had offended in an identical way in the past against the same victim. 32 Prior
misconduct by the same perpetrator that is less severe than the misconduct
in the plaintiff’s case will often fail to provide actual notice. 33 In the same
way, prior similar misconduct by the same perpetrator that is directed at a
different victim34 or misconduct that is committed by someone other than
the perpetrator may not be sufficient notice. 35
Second, courts are reluctant to impose liability under the Gebser/Davis
standard for sexual misconduct committed by someone other than a student
or employee of the educational institution defendant.36 As with the other
limitations of Gebser/Davis liability, the requirement that institutions have
control over the harasser is rooted in fairness concerns that arise when
compensatory damages are at issue. As a result, however, the threat of
liability for damages provides little incentive to address even known threats
posed by outsiders.
Third, the location of the misconduct can also make it more difficult for
the plaintiff to satisfy the Gebser/Davis standard. This is especially true in
cases where courts reject the idea that institutional liability could apply to
misconduct that occurs between students in off-campus housing.37
32. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for
Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038, 2070 (2016).
33. Id. (citing Harden v. Rosie, 99 A.3d 950, 954–63 (Pa. 2014)).
34. Id. (citing Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999)).
35. Id.
36. E.g., Hall v. Millersville Univ., 400 F. Supp. 3d 252, 289 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (reasoning
that “educational institutions [are] on notice that they face potential liability for the
misconduct of their students or other parties whom they play a critical role in connecting
with the student” but not “a guest whom the university had no role in bringing to campus”);
Samuelson v. Or. State Univ., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1134 (D. Or. 2016) (finding that the
university “had no chance to vet” the harasser), aff’d, 725 F. App’x 598 (9th Cir. 2018). The
University of Utah is being sued by parents of a student who was murdered in her dorm
room by her boyfriend non-student. Hanna Knowles & Marisa Iati, An Officer Allegedly
Showed Explicit Photos of a Woman Later Killed by Her Ex-Boyfriend, WASH. POST (May
19, 2020, 7:34 AM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/05/18/anofficer-allegedly-showed-off-explicit-photos-woman-later-killed-by-her-boyfriend/.
The
parents allege that the university had knowledge of the threat, but the University contends
that they cannot be liable for damages under Title IX because the assailant was not a student.
See Hall v. Millersville Univ., 400 F. Supp. 3d 252, 289–90 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
37. See Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874, 884 (8th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court
has made it clear, however, that to be liable for deliberate indifference under Title IX, a
University must have had control over the situation in which the harassment or rape
occurs.”) (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999)); see also
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Finally, the Gebser/Davis standard defines deliberate indifference as a
“clearly unreasonable” response to the threat it has received notice of. 38
Consequently, this standard permits educational institutions to avoid
liability in most cases. Even institutions that fail to respond at all to notice
of a threat of sexual misconduct can sometimes avoid liability. For
example, a university might not investigate a student’s reported rape
because it believed in good faith that investigative efforts would hinder law
enforcement,39 or that the student’s failure to file a formal complaint
justified a lack of response. 40
Incomplete and impartial responses are even more likely to survive
challenge. Even institutions whose responses violate their own policies, 41 or
Hannah Brenner Johnson, Standing In Between Sexual Violence Victims and Access to
Justice: The Limits of Title IX, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 37 (2020).
38. MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 2066–67 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648); see also
A.J. Bolan, Note, Deliberate Indifference: Why Universities Must Do More to Protect
Students from Sexual Assault, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804, 816 n.71 (2018) (citing examples
of cases that demonstrate the weakness of the deliberate indifference standard).
39. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 15-cv-05779-RS, 2016 WL 2961984, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2016). Nonresponse does give rise to liability in other cases. See, e.g.,
Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 700–01 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that deliberate
indifference could be satisfied by evidence that university official dismissed plaintiff’s
complaint about sexual harassment by her coach, telling her that that coach “was a ‘great
guy’ and that she should work out her problems directly with him”).
40. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d at 883; see also Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 180 F. Supp. 3d
951, 969 (N.D. Okla. 2016) (“Campus security officers and school administrators walk a
fine line when they investigate a report of sexual assault by a victim who is unwilling to
proceed or make any specific accusations. . . . [The victim] only had one semester left of
school and did not want any disruption of her life prior to her graduation. Interviewing [the
victim’s friend, the assaulter], and other members of the small [University of Tulsa] campus
or ultimately taking action against [the assaulter] would undoubtedly have caused this type
of unwanted disruption. While perhaps not in accordance with Title IX best practices or the
OCR’s guidance in the DCL, [the university’s] response [to the victim’s report] could not be
deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’ in light of the nature of such report.”), aff’d, 859 F.3d 1280
(10th Cir. 2017). But see Butters v. James Madison Univ., 145 F. Supp. 3d 610, 614, 621
(W.D. Va. 2015) (denying motion to dismiss where university justified its alleged failure to
respond on complainant’s unwillingness to file a formal complaint).
41. Facchetti v. Bridgewater Coll., 175 F. Supp. 3d 627, 637–39 (W.D. Va. 2016)
(concluding that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege deliberate indifference even though her
complaint alleged that the university violated its own policy by deterring her from reporting
the matter to the police, failing to advise her of her rights, preventing her from presenting
witnesses, and excluding her from information about the disciplinary process); Thomas v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Neb. State Coll., No. 8:12-CV-412, 2015 WL 4546712, at *13–14 (D.
Neb. July 28, 2015) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that university’s failure to ensure that the
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violate policies promulgated by the Office for Civil Rights42 have avoided
liability under the deliberate indifference standard.
C. Deliberate Indifference as the New Regulatory Standard?
Because deliberate indifference is the legal equivalent of intentional
discrimination, the Gebser/Davis standard sets a low bar for institutions to
clear in order to avoid liability. It is, by design, a much more permissive
standard than regulators should use in their enforcement efforts. For many
years, the Department of Education expressly acknowledged its authority to
hold institutions to a higher standard than deliberate indifference. 43 The
Department requires institutions subject to Title IX to engage in a “prompt
and effective” response to discrimination. 44
In 1997,45 and again in 2001, the Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), which
is the agency within the Department of Education that enforces civil rights
laws prohibiting discrimination in schools, 46 confirmed that this
requirement applies to sexual harassment (a subset of sex discrimination,
which is prohibited by Title IX).47 OCR also confirmed that an institution’s
response must include “immediate and appropriate steps to investigate or
otherwise determine what occurred.” 48 Those initial steps must then be
student accused of rape and murder completed sanctions for earlier acts of misconduct was
deliberate indifference), aff’d, 667 F. App’x 560 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
42. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291–92 (1998); Karasek v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093, 1107–09 (9th Cir. 2020). At best, courts
consider noncompliance with the regulatory standard a factor to consider in the overall
assessment of deliberate indifference. Butters v. James Madison Univ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 745,
757 (W.D. Va. 2016); Doe v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., No. 1:13-CV-428, 2015 WL 9906260,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015).
43. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE : HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD
PARTIES
iii–iv
(2001),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf
[hereinafter 2001 REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE ] (noting that the Gebser and
Davis standards apply to private causes of action for monetary damages).
44. See id. at iii.
45. Sexual Harassment Guidance 1997, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar01.html (last visited June 1, 2020).
46. See About OCR, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
aboutocr.html (last visited June 1, 2020).
47. 2001 REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 43, at 19–20 (noting that
schools should “provid[e] . . . prompt and equitable resolution” to sexual harassment
claims).
48. Id. at 15.
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followed by “steps reasonably calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a
hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent harassment from
occurring again.”49 Furthermore, the school is “responsible for taking steps
to remedy the effects of the harassment on the [affected] individual.”50 OCR
otherwise avoided imposing specific and uniform requirements on diverse
educational institutions, instead preferring a “prompt and equitable” caseby-case evaluation that maximizes institutions’ flexibility to create
procedures best suited to their needs.51
In the wake of increased public attention to the problem of sexual assault
on college campuses and lackluster responses by university officials, OCR
offered further clarification in a Dear Colleague Letter released on April 4,
2011.52 This clarification aimed to end certain institutional practices,
including the following:
$

Improperly delegating investigation responsibilities to local law
enforcement; 53

$

Imposing watered-down or no sanctions on responsible parties;54

$

Discouraging victims from filing complaints—sometimes by
pressuring them into informal mediation, excluding victims from
disciplinary hearings; 55

$

Imposing an
perpetrators;56

$

Prohibiting victims from speaking about the matter; 57 and

$

Failing to inform victims of investigation outcomes. 58

evidentiary

standard

that

overprotects

Further, the Dear Colleague Letter required a university to investigate even
when the alleged victim refused to file a complaint or actively participate in

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19–20.
Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3.
Id. at 8 n.23.
See id. at 12–13.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9–12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13–14.
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a disciplinary proceeding. 59 Even though it is not appropriate to impose
sanctions on an alleged perpetrator whose victim does not testify, the Dear
Colleague Letter imposed a duty to respond to sexual assault that extended
beyond efforts to identify and discipline the perpetrator. It also required
universities to “pursue other steps to limit the effects of the alleged
harassment and prevent its recurrence.” 60 Such obligations include
providing support and accommodations for the victim and engaging the
community in prevention and training efforts.61
The current administration is changing course. First, the OCR withdrew
the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter. 62 Then, in November 2018, the Office
proposed new regulations that incorporate the judicial deliberate
indifference standard into its enforcement standard.63 It finalized these
regulations in May 2020, 64 codifying the deliberate indifference standard in
a new provision, 34 C.F.R. 106.44(a):

A recipient with actual knowledge of sexual harassment in an
education program or activity of the recipient against a person
in the United States, must respond promptly in a manner that
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id. The Letter also explains that in serious cases, an institution should not let the
victim’s request for confidentiality limit the university’s response in ways that jeopardize the
safety of the community. Id. at 5–6.
61. Id. at 5–6. Subsequent guidance clarified this point even further. See Office for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence 20
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf
(“Examples include providing increased monitoring, supervision, or security at locations or
activities where the misconduct occurred; providing training and education materials for
students and employees; changing and publicizing the school’s policies on sexual violence;
and conducting climate surveys regarding sexual violence. In instances affecting many
students, an alleged perpetrator can be put on notice of allegations of harassing behavior and
be counseled appropriately without revealing, even indirectly, the identity of the student
complainant. A school must also take immediate action as necessary to protect the student
while keeping the identity of the student confidential. These actions may include providing
support services to the student and changing living arrangements or course schedules,
assignments, or tests.”).
62. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61464–65 n.10 (proposed Nov.
29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
63. Id. at 61466.
64. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30026, 30033–46, 30574 (final rule
published May 19, 2020, effective Aug. 14, 2020) (codified at 34 C.F.R. 106.44(a)).
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is not deliberately indifferent. A recipient is deliberately
indifferent only if its response to sexual harassment is clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. 65
The Department of Education has also diluted the notice standard that
had previously been used in enforcement efforts. Whereas the prior
administration required educational institutions to respond to sexual
harassment that they “kn[ew] or reasonably should know about,”66 the new
regulations adopt the judicial standard of actual knowledge in this regard, as
well.67 This change reduces institutional accountability by ensuring that
neither administrative enforcement nor judicial enforcement under the
Gebser/Davis standard adequately pressures universities to address
situations where the threat was not formally reported to university officials,
even though they may have encountered information from which they
reasonably should have understood that a threat existed or inquired further
about this possibility. It may even provide incentive for university officials
to avoid information that would give them actual knowledge of a threat.68
By unnecessarily adopting the Gebser/Davis standard for institutional
liability, the new regulations therefore threaten to weaken Title IX’s role in
holding institutions accountable for responding to sexual misconduct
committed by students, faculty, and staff. Because it is already difficult for
victims to hold institutions accountable for mishandling Title IX
adjudications, it is time to examine other theories of liability that might be
brought to bear on educational institutions.

65. 34 C.F.R. 106.44(a) (2020).
66. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 4; see also 2001 REVISED SEXUAL
HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 43, at iv.
67. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. at 30089 (defining “actual knowledge” to mean
“notice of sexual harassment or allegations of sexual harassment to a recipient’s Title IX
Coordinator or any official of the recipient who has the authority to institute corrective
measures on behalf of the recipient”).
68. See, e.g., American Association of University Professors, Comments on the
Department of Education’s Proposed Title IX Regulations 2 (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/AAUP%20title%20IX%20exec%20summary_0.pdf;
see generally Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge,
Knowledge Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 205 (2011).
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II. Official Policy Liability
Most sexual misconduct cases arising from the educational setting are
litigated under the Gebser/Davis standard, which only imposes liability for
an institution’s indifferent response to the known acts of others. However,
Title IX also imposes liability on educational institutions for their own,
official discriminatory policies, custom, or pattern of practice. 69 This theory
of liability is so commonplace in Title IX cases—outside the sexual
misconduct context—that it is rarely named or discussed outside of certain
situations; for example, when a court must correct the mistaken belief that a
university athletic department must have actual notice and respond with
deliberate indifference to sex-based disparities in providing resources and
opportunities.70
In the context of sexual harassment, however, cases alleging
discriminatory official policy are comparatively rare. Yet, it is clear that
Gebser and Davis did not foreclose the application of official policy
liability to the sexual harassment context. Simpson v. University of
Colorado Boulder was the first case to apply official policy liability in this
way. 71 Though most lower courts that had an opportunity to consider
official policy liability claims in the sexual harassment context rejected its
application, the recent cases involving Tennessee and Baylor may be
breathing new life into this doctrine.
A. Official Policy Liability’s Supreme Court Origins
When the Supreme Court established the deliberate indifference standard
in Gebser and Davis, it did not proffer that standard as the exclusive Title
IX remedy for sexual harassment. While both cases utilized a deliberate
indifference standard to assess institutional liability for sexual misconduct
committed by a third party under its control, neither plaintiff alleged that
the institution’s indifference amounted to, or stemmed from, the
69. See infra Section IV.A.1.
70. See, e.g., Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 969 (9th Cir.
2010) (“We therefore join the Fifth Circuit in holding that Gebser’s notice requirement is
inapplicable to cases alleging that a funding recipient has failed effectively to accommodate
women’s interest in athletics.”); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 882 (5th Cir.
2000) (“In the instant case, it is the institution itself that is discriminating. The proper test is
not whether it knew of or is responsible for the actions of others, but is whether Appellees
intended to treat women differently on the basis of their sex by providing them unequal
athletic opportunity . . . .”).
71. 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
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university’s own official policy. 72 The Gebser Court expressly noted this
distinction, limiting the applicability of the standard it employed to “cases
like this one that do not involve official policy of the recipient entity.” 73
This language created the possibility that, even in cases involving sexual
harassment, institutions might be liable for their own discriminatory policy
under a standard distinct from the Gebser/Davis standard.
Additionally, when crafting the Gebser/Davis standard, the Supreme
Court supported the idea that deliberate indifference was tantamount to
intentional discrimination when it analogized it to the standard for
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the standard for
municipal liability defines intentional discrimination to include both
indifference to the discriminatory acts of employees and discriminatory
policies and practices of the municipality itself, 74 the Court’s reference to
municipal liability supports a parallel interpretation of intentional
discrimination under Title IX, as well: incorporating both the education
institution’s deliberate indifference to acts of discrimination committed by
its students or employees, as well as discriminatory official policies and
practices of the educational institution itself.75
B. Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder
In the 2007 case of Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, a federal
appellate court examined official policy liability in a sexual harassment
case for the first time. 76 Here, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated
two plaintiffs’ claims that the university was liable for their sexual assaults,
which were perpetrated by high school students on a recruiting visit hosted
72. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999); Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290–93 (1998).
73. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
74. Id. at 291; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). The Tenth Circuit in Simpson noted
this connection as well. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178 (“[I]t is when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
75. For example, under the § 1983 standard, a municipality may be held liable for
discrimination inherent in its own staffing or training policy if the policy is obviously
inadequate to protect likely violations of constitutional rights—such as arming police with
weapons but failing to train officers on when the use of deadly force is legal. See Simpson,
500 F.3d at 1178–79 (discussing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)).
76. Id. at 1184–85.
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by the University of Colorado football team. 77 The university had arranged
for female undergraduates to host the recruits and “show them a good
time,” which the recruits apparently understood to mean sex. 78 Though the
plaintiffs framed the case utilizing the typical Gebser/Davis framework, the
court instead found the plaintiffs’ evidence supported an alternative theory
of liability. 79
The court based this theory on the university’s own discriminatory
policy, which set up unsupervised high school football players with
underclass female students with no clear instructions other than a general
expectation to appeal and entertain. 80 The court noted that the football
program’s failure to train or supervise the female students hired to host
football recruits and “show them a good time” was deliberate indifference
to an obvious risk, akin to a municipality that fails to train police officers on
the proper deployment of firearms it provides. 81 The risk of sexual
misconduct in college football programs in general—and at the University
of Colorado in particular—had been well-known for years and documented
by research and media accounts.82 Numerous instances of sexual assault
involving football recruits or the football program had occurred frequently
enough in the past without athletic department officials intervening or
addressing the program, despite the urging of law enforcement and others. 83
Therefore, the court found that there was evidence that could establish a
causal link between the university’s official policy and the risk of sexual
misconduct.
C. Simpson in Contrast to the Gebser/Davis Deliberate Indifference
Standard
One way to understand how the Simpson standard differs from the
Gebser/Davis standard is to contrast the appellate court’s decision with the
lower court’s decision. The lower court in Simpson relied on the
Gebser/Davis standard to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.84 In doing so, the
77. Id. at 1173.
78. Id. at 1180 (quoting Appellant’s App. Volume VII at 1343).
79. Id. at 1175–78.
80. Id. at 1180.
81. Id. at 1178–79 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)).
82. Id. at 1181.
83. Id.
84. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1233–35 (D. Colo. 2005), rev’d,
500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
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district court acknowledged that though Gebser/Davis liability is not
limited to situations involving institutional indifference to a threat posed by
precisely the same individual as the one who caused the harm, it does
require that an institution ignore a “well-defined and focused” risk of
harm. 85 Though the head coach and other officials were aware of prior
sexual misconduct committed by individuals involved in the football
program, those prior instances were distinguishable from the harm that the
plaintiffs faced.86 In those instances, either the sexual misconduct was
committed by football recruits but not against current students, or the
misconduct was committed against other students but by current players
and not recruits.87 The Simpson plaintiffs could not prove that, prior to their
sexual assaults, the head coach and other officials knew with certainty that
recruiting events had included alcohol, strippers, and lap dances. 88 As to
what the officials did know, the court determined that they were not
deliberately indifferent because they responded to the incident by
disciplining the players involved. 89
The analyses of the appellate and district courts in Simpson illustrate two
key differences between Title IX liability under official policy liability and
the Gebser/Davis standard. The first key difference is the extent to which
courts may infer notice of discrimination. The notice requirement under the
Gebser/Davis standard permits a narrower range of inferences from past
events and discounts knowledge of general risks.90 In contrast, a
university’s official policy can be discriminatory if it fails to address a clear
or obvious risk, where obviousness can be established by a wider range of
information. 91 The appellate court in Simpson did not limit its notice inquiry
to the limited facts of the alleged sexual assault at issue—incidents between
students and football recruits. Instead, the court considered what knowledge
university and football officials generally had of sexual misconduct within
its football program and other college football programs.92

85. Id. at 1236.
86. Id. at 1238–40.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1240–42.
89. Id. at 1244–45.
90. See id. at 1236 (“In other words, the risk at issue must be well-defined and focused
to support a claim of Title IX liability.”).
91. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007).
92. Id. at 1180–85.
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The second key difference is the role institutional policies play. The
Gebser/Davis standard permits institutions to avoid liability by taking
narrow, focused steps in response to the particular circumstances of known
events. 93 Consequently, an institution would rarely be faulted for failing to
address systemic shortcomings with policy changes. But under official
policy liability, institutional policies are much more important than narrow
responses to prior events. In Simpson, the appellate court made clear that
institutions can also be held responsible for indifference inherent in their
policies.94
In sum, Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder confirms official
policy liability as a distinct alternative to the Gebser/Davis deliberate
indifference standard. It also illustrates how Title IX promotes institutional
accountability for official decisions, as opposed to isolated instances of
indifference, and for institutions’ failure to address clear and obvious risks
that would not necessarily satisfy the actual notice requirement.
D. Official Policy Liability After Simpson
Few judicial decisions address official policy claims in the context of
sexual misconduct. Among the small subset of Title IX sexual misconduct
cases that do include official policy claims, most produce decisions in
which the court distinguishes Simpson and rejects the claim. Thus, recent
decisions in which lower courts rejected motions to dismiss official policy
claims against Baylor University and the University of Tennessee are
noteworthy.
1. Post-Simpson Official Policy Cases
In decisions rejecting official policy claims, courts commonly
distinguish Simpson on the grounds that the official policy in that case was
one that affirmatively encouraged sexual misconduct. For example, a
federal court in Kansas dismissed claims that a university’s policy against
investigating off-campus sexual violence constituted a discriminatory
official policy under Title IX.95 “Unlike in Simpson,” the court reasoned,
the university “did not have an official policy that affirmatively encouraged
students to engage in conduct off campus that could lead to sexual
93. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1235–37 (D. Colo. 2005),
rev’d, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
94. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007).
95. Weckhorst v. Kan. State Univ., No. 16-CV-2255-JAR-GEB, 2017 WL 3674963, at
*8 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2017).
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harassment or assault.”96 Courts in other cases have also drawn similar
distinctions, thus rejecting official policy liability. 97
Similarly, absent allegations of a causal connection between an
institution’s policy and a threat of sexual assault, courts have rejected
attempts to challenge training, grievance, or other policies. 98 In one case, a
federal court refused to dismiss challenges to Stony Brook University’s
grievance procedures because the university “had actual knowledge of a
‘significant increase in reported sexual assaults at Stony Brook over the
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., K.S-A v. Haw., Dep’t of Educ., Civ. No. 16-00115 ACK-KJM, 2018 WL
2144143, at *16 (D. Haw. May 9, 2018) (“Here, unlike in Simpson, there does not appear to
be any evidence suggesting that Defendant created a situation which would encourage
harassing conduct such that it needed to provide further training and policies to prevent such
conduct from occurring.”); Tackett v. Univ. of Kan., 234 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1107 (D. Kan.
2017) (“Plaintiff attempts to graft Simpson liability by alleging KU required its female
rowers to attend football games and cheer for the players as they entered the field, even if the
rowers had been sexually assaulted by the players. Plaintiff also alleges that KU has an
official policy and practice of entertaining football recruits in hotel just off campus and
encouraging female KU athletes to attend parties with the recruits. But these alleged policies
played no part in plaintiff’s rape. Encouraging attendance and cheering at football games is
not the equivalent of pairing female students with recruits to show them a good time.”)
(internal citations omitted); C.T. v. Liberal Sch. Dist., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1340 (D. Kan.
2008) (“Unlike CU’s program of showing football recruits a ‘good time’ that was at issue in
Simpson, a mere weight training program does not bear the element of encouragement of
misconduct by the school district.”).
98. See, e.g., Doherty v. Am. Int’l Coll., No. 17-CV-10161-IT, 2019 WL 1440399, at *6
(D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2019) (citing and contrasting Simpson in case where the plaintiff “has not
shown how the identified training materials could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that
AIC’s training of the relevant officials was obviously deficient as to constitute a deliberate
indifference to provide its Title IX administrators proper training”); Raihan v. George
Washington Univ., 324 F. Supp. 3d 102, 109 (D.D.C. 2018) (“But ‘the failure to promulgate
a grievance procedure does not itself constitute “discrimination” under Title IX,’ and neither
does non-compliance with federal regulations.”) (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998)); Kollaritsch v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 298 F. Supp.
3d 1089, 1104–05 (W.D. Mich. 2017) (stating that “MSU’s alleged failure to publish and
distribute information about its sexual harassment policies and procedures” is
distinguishable from the facts of Simpson because “[p]laintiffs here have not identified an
official policy of MSU that created situations where sexual harassment or sexual assaults
had occurred in the past, and where the risk had been ignored”); Doe v. Emerson Coll., 271
F. Supp. 3d 337, 356–57 (D. Mass. 2017) (concluding that Title IX only imposes liability for
insufficient training policies where a school “sanctions a specific program that, without
proper control, would encourage sexual harassment and abuse such that the need for training
or guidance is obvious”) (quoting C.T., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1339).
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years.’”99 The court further found that the deficiency of the university’s
responses to and policies regarding sexual assaults, which OCR had
previously criticized, justified denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss
and permitting the plaintiff’s claim of official policy discrimination to
proceed.100 Also, in another case not involving official policy liability, the
Eleventh Circuit held a school district liable under Title IX for its failure to
improve its discipline, recordkeeping, and sexual harassment training
following a student rape.101 In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned
that, had it been stronger, the sexual harassment training may have
prevented the rape. 102 Though most decisions have failed to apply official
policy liability, two recent cases seem to buck this trend.
2. Plaintiffs Successfully Allege Official Policy Claim Against the
University of Tennessee
In 2016, eight present and former female students sued the University of
Tennessee. 103 Seven plaintiffs 104 alleged that they were sexually assaulted
by male students affiliated with the football and basketball teams while
enrolled at the university. 105 Each plaintiff attributed their assault to
institutional indifference to prior instances of misconduct known to
university officials. 106 Further, the plaintiffs alleged several specific policies
had put them at risk of the sexual assault they ultimately experienced. 107
The Tennessee district court found that the plaintiffs had alleged a prima
facie case under the Gebser/Davis standard, and that they had sufficiently
99. Tubbs v. Stony Brook Univ., No. 15 Civ. 0517 (NSR), 2016 WL 8650463, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2016).
100. Id.
101. Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 973–75 (11th Cir. 2015).
102. Id. In this case, a staff member who was not sufficiently trained orchestrated a
scheme to use the plaintiff as “bait” to catch a student who was threatening to sexually
assault her. Id. at 973–74. The court considered these examples of post-assault policy inertia
not on their own, but as part of an overall analysis of the school district’s deliberate
indifference under Gebser/Davis to the threat this perpetrator was known to pose. Id. 973–
75.
103. Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 791 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).
104. Id. The other plaintiff’s alleged injury was retaliation for participating in an
investigation into the sexual assault of her teammate and roommate, who was also one of the
other plaintiffs. Id. at 800. Such retaliation is actionable under Title IX but is outside the
scope of this Article. See id. at 809.
105. Id. at 791.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 791–92.
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alleged discriminatory official policies. 108 Applying Gebser/Davis, the court
found that the plaintiffs had “allege[d] far more than UT’s knowledge of
general risks or stereotypical assumptions[.]”109 According to the court,
university officials had been “put on notice of a specific and concrete
pattern of an ‘inordinate’ number of sexual assault allegations against
members of specific [athletic] teams.” 110
Concerning the plaintiffs’ discriminatory official policy claims, the court
accepted plaintiffs’ allegations that the university promoted or sustained a
culture that gave rise to the sexual violence they experienced. 111 For
example, the athletic department allegedly encouraged players to host
“parties with underage drinking to benefit recruiting.” 112 Further, the
athletic department adopted as the football team’s anthem the song “Turn
Down for What,” which the court noted to be “associated with ‘sexual
violence and rape culture.’”113 The department even went so far as to
arrange for the song’s creator, rapper Lil Jon, to make a guest appearance at
a team event.114
The athletic department also failed to modify a housing policy that
permitted female freshmen and upper-class male athletes to reside in the
same dorm, even though the dorm served as the location for many of the
plaintiffs’ sexual assaults and prior assaults.115 Moreover, the court found
that certain actions that the athletic department took allegedly helped foster
a culture that encouraged sexual misconduct.116 Namely, the department
had allegedly engaged in a pattern of covering up past instances of sexual
misconduct committed by athletes; arranged for their legal representation;

108. Id. at 805–06.
109. Id. at 807.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 806–08.
112. Id. at 793 (quoting the First Amended Complaint ¶ 23 (Docket No. 22)).
113. Id. (quoting the First Amended Complaint).
114. Id. (citing the First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 148–153).
115. See Complaint at 44, Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788 (M.D. Tenn. 2016)
(No. 3:16-CV-199), 2016 WL 503310. In response to multiple alleged assaults in 2011, a
university official unsuccessfully urged the athletic department and other university officials
to address the rash of sexual assaults perpetrated by athletes, such as by changing the
housing policies and ending their interference and influence over disciplinary process. Id. at
9–12.
116. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 806–08.
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interfered with and influenced the disciplinary process; and allowed athletes
to avoid or delay discipline in order to complete their seasons. 117
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the university and athletic
department’s response to their reports of sexual assault amounted to both
deliberate indifference and discriminatory official policy. 118 Specifically,
the plaintiffs alleged that the university’s intentional delay of proceedings,
tolerance of harassment, lax enforcement procedures, and failure to conduct
sufficient hearings amounted to both a deliberate indifference and
discriminatory official policies.119
The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief, but the university
moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. 120 Accordingly, the court
considered whether the allegations, if proven, could give rise to liability
under Title IX. 121 The court denied the motion.122 While the case settled
before the litigation could proceed further,123 the court’s preliminary ruling
provides a touchstone for assessing the kinds of facts that, if true, could
give rise to liability under Title IX under a theory of discriminatory official
policy.
3. Plaintiffs Successfully Allege Official Policy Liability Against Baylor
University
In another case, fifteen plaintiffs filed two separate lawsuits against
Baylor University alleging that Baylor’s discriminatory official policies and
indifference to specific prior instances of assault led to each of them being
sexually assaulted by another student. 124 While some of the alleged
assailants were members of the football team and other men’s athletics
117. Id. at 793–94.
118. Id. at 791–92.
119. Id. at 793–95.
120. Id. at 800.
121. Id. at 804–08.
122. Id. at 815–16. “The ‘before’ claims of Jane Does II–IV and VI–VIII will proceed, as
will Jane Doe V’s retaliation claim and the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief.” Id. at 815.
123. Marie Andrusewicz, University of Tennessee Settles Sexual Assault Lawsuit, NPR:
THE TWO-WAY (July 6, 2016, 5:04 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/07/06/484891430/university-of-tennessee-settles-sexual-assault-lawsuit.
124. Doe 12 v. Baylor Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 763, 770–73 (W.D. Tex. 2018); Doe 1 v.
Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 653–56 (W.D. Tex. 2017). These cases were
consolidated with each other, and with a case that has not yet produced any dispositive
opinions, Jane Doe 11 v. Baylor Univ., No. 6:17-CV-228-RP. The consolidated case, No.
6:16-cv-173-RP, is currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas.
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teams at Baylor, most were not student athletes. 125 The plaintiffs alleged
that Baylor University officials, including campus police and health
services, took inadequate measures in response to their allegations of sexual
assault. They claim that university officials misinformed victims about their
rights under Title IX, provided inaccurate information about reporting
options, discouraged them from reporting, failed to conduct investigations
and disciplinary proceedings, withheld remedial measures, and failed to
take steps to prevent campus encounters between the victims and their
assailants.126 As a result, plaintiffs alleged, the absence of accountability
allowed sexual misconduct to flourish. 127
Moreover, during a time period when Baylor received multiple reports of
sexual assault, the plaintiffs alleged that the university reported zero sexual
assaults to the Department of Education. 128 In doing so, the plaintiffs
alleged that Baylor increased the risk of further sexual assault against the
plaintiffs.129 Baylor moved to dismiss the suit, but, after determining that
the plaintiffs had successfully alleged claims under both Gebser/Davis and
official policy liability, the federal court denied Baylor’s motion. 130
The court rejected Baylor’s argument that it lacked control over some of
the alleged assaults that occurred off campus, suggesting that control is not
a relevant consideration for official policy claims and rejecting the
contention that universities lack control over events between students that
occur in off-campus housing.131 Citing Supreme Court decisions that affirm
the relationship between policy and custom, the court also rejected Baylor’s
argument that employees’ conduct in implementing official policies should
not count as evidence of those policies’ content. 132
In the wake of the court’s decisions denying Baylor’s motions to dismiss,
the litigation has been in pre-trial discovery phase. But regardless whether
the case proceeds to trial or settles, the court’s recognition of the plaintiffs’
official policy claims, like the decision against the University of Tennessee,
helps illuminate the potential for official policy claims to promote
institutional accountability, as examined in the next section.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 770–73; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 653–56.
Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 770–73; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 653–56.
Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 779–80; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 661–62.
Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 773; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 662.
Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 770–73; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 661–62.
Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 779–83; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 661–62.
Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 780–81.
Id. at 782–83.
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III. Tennessee and Baylor Decisions: Analysis and Opportunity
Part III will underscore the Baylor and Tennessee decisions’ expansive
treatment of the elements of a Title IX claim for liability based on
discriminatory official policy. It will then offer suggestions for application
of the doctrine in an era of uncertain regulatory enforcement. Specifically,
this Part highlights the deficiencies in deliberate indifference that are
resolved through the application of official policy liability.
A. Analysis of the Tennessee and Baylor Decisions
After Simpson, a Title IX claim of discriminatory official policy must
satisfy three elements: (1) there must be an “official” policy, custom, or
pattern of practice; (2) the official policy must be discriminatory—either
facially by intentionally treating students differently on the basis of sex, or
inherently by demonstrating indifference to an obvious threat of sexual
harassment; and (3) as the Baylor court emphasized, the policy must cause
the harm in question by exposing the plaintiff to the risk of sexual
harassment. 133 The decisions refusing to dismiss official policy liability
claims against Baylor and Tennessee apply these elements in a way that
faithfully applies Simpson while maximizing the potential for the doctrine
to hold institutions accountable. As such, a close examination of these
recent cases may help breathe new life into the official policy doctrine.
1. Official Policy
Both decisions accepted the possibility that plaintiffs could prove that
repeated actions by university officials could establish a university’s
“official” policy.134 The Baylor decisions addressed this issue most directly
because Baylor had argued “that its written . . . Title IX policy, and ‘not
employee violations of the policy,’ constituted Baylor’s official policy at
133. In one of its decisions, the district court in Baylor’s case stated:
The Court remains sensitive to concerns that application of the official policy
rubric to claims involving a school-wide risk of sexual assault may be taken to
imply that higher education institutions, due to the prevalence of sexual assault
among college-aged individuals, would face near-constant liability. . . . But the
official-policy rubric’s extension of liability is limited by its demand that
plaintiffs demonstrate the misconduct complained of was “not simply
misconduct that happened to occur [at the school] among its students,” but was
in fact caused by an official policy or custom of the university.
Id. at 780 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d
1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007)).
134. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 782; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 662.
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the time of the alleged assaults.”135 The court rejected this argument, citing
Simpson and Gebser’s analogy to municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which applies to both policy and custom. 136 Accordingly, to survive a
motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs’ allegations need only establish that the
institution’s “practice of inadequately handling and even discouraging
reports of peer sexual assault constituted an official policy.” 137
2. Discriminatory Policy
The Simpson court explained that an institution’s official policy can be
intentionally discriminatory if the institution retains the policy in the face of
evidence that that the policy increases the risk that students will endure
sexual misconduct.138 Because of the nature of the policy and the threat at
issue in Simpson, the Tenth Circuit examined whether the athletic
department knew about rampant sexual assault in college football in
general.139 Equally important, however, was whether the department knew
about past sexual misconduct that, while not identical to the facts in
Simpson, occurred within the university’s football program. 140 In light of
university officials’ knowledge, the policy of allowing unsupervised
football recruiting visits and encouraging hosts to indulge the recruits was
indifferent to the known risk and thus intentionally discriminatory. 141
The Baylor and Tennessee courts also accepted plaintiffs’ arguments that
an institutional policy could intentionally discriminate by expressing
indifference to a known threat.142 But the courts’ analysis in each case
suggests that specific allegations of who knew what about which past
assaults is not essential for official policy claims, despite the Simpson court
focusing on those issues. 143
135. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 782 (quoting Def.’s Motion to Dismiss Doe 12, Docket
No. 20, at 8; Def.’s Motion to Dismiss Doe 14, Docket No. 22, at 7–10; Def.’s Motion to
Dismiss Doe 15, Docket No. 23, at 8–9).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178.
139. Id. at 1181.
140. Id. at 1180–82.
141. Id. at 1184–85.
142. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 781–83; Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646,
660–61 (W.D. Tex. 2017); Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 806 (M.D. Tenn.
2016).
143. Compare Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1176 (discussing the importance of actual
knowledge in Title IX official policy claims), with Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 779 (holding
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In Tennessee, the court highlighted allegations that described the
university’s indifference as a failure to amend its policies and practices
despite a pattern of sexual assault incidents involving athletes and criticism
from numerous university officials. 144 Those officials included university
personnel outside athletics, others within athletics, and the former vicechancellor of the university.145 Each official raised concerns about the
athletic department’s interference with disciplinary proceedings, continued
practice of co-housing female freshmen and upper-class male athletes,
refusal to train athletes about sexual assault, and replacement of female
staff and administrators with male employees. 146 Notably, the court did not
compare the facts of those incidents to those that the plaintiff
experienced. 147 By declining to do so, the Tennessee court emphasized that
the proper inquiry in an official policy claim is whether the university had
general knowledge—rather than actual knowledge—of a specific threat.148
Baylor’s alleged indifference was even more apparent on the face of the
practices of its staff—tantamount to policies—in obstructing the plaintiffs
from reporting, handling investigations inadequately, and misreporting
sexual assault incidents. 149 In Baylor, the court did not require the plaintiffs
to allege that university officials were aware of the impact that these
deficiencies had on specific incidents of sexual assault or campus sexual
assault in general; instead, the court allowed the obvious
correlation/connection to speak for itself.150 While not requiring the
plaintiffs to prove university official knowledge of the activities, plaintiffs
are still bound to show causation between these practices and the
misconduct they experienced.
3. Causation
The most notable aspect of the Tennessee and Baylor decisions is the
way the federal courts treated the element of causation. In Simpson, that
that actual notice is not required where a Title IX violation is caused by official policy), and
Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 661 (explaining that actual notice is not required in official policy
cases), and Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 805 (rejecting argument that actual knowledge
is required for official policy claims).
144. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 793–94, 806–07.
145. Id. at 793–94.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 807–08.
149. See Doe 12 v. Baylor Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 763, 782–83 (W.D. Tex. 2018).
150. See id.
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court found causation where the university created and administered the
football recruiting program in a way that directly provided the plaintiffs’
assailants with access and opportunity to commit sexual assault.151 In
contrast, Tennessee’s discriminatory official policies were alleged to have
infected the culture of the entire athletic department—not just the football
program. 152 And Baylor’s policies were not even confined to the athletic
department, but allegedly affected the university campus as a whole. 153
In this way, the Tennessee and Baylor decisions depart from other cases
that distinguish Simpson on the grounds that the allegedly discriminatory
official policy was not targeted at a specific program, such as “football
recruiting.”154 For example, a federal district court in Massachusetts
declined to hold a university liable for its allegedly insufficient training
policies by reading Simpson to require a “specific program” giving rise to
the threat of sexual harassment or abuse. 155 But as the Baylor and Tennessee
courts read Simpson, it is not essential that the allegedly discriminatory
policy operate within a specific university program that gave rise to threat
of harassment.
Additionally, as noted above, 156 some lower court decisions have read
Simpson to mandate that the policy in question created the threat by
providing “affirmative encouragement,” such as by pairing high school
males with freshman female hosts who have been trained and instructed
only to try to show the recruits a good time. 157 These decisions have
allowed allegations to proceed because a failure to hold earlier offender
accountable could evidence the policy’s active role in creating the threat. 158
A university’s policies can play an active role in elevating the threat of
sexual assault or misconduct by directly causing the conduct at issue, or
through more remote causes.159
In Tennessee, the athletic department’s policy and custom of helping
athletes avoid punishment demonstrated institutional tolerance for sexual
151. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1184–85 (10th Cir. 2007).
152. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 807.
153. See Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 769–70; Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646,
654–56 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
154. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
155. Doe v. Emerson Coll., 271 F. Supp. 3d 337, 356–57 (D. Mass. 2017).
156. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
157. Weckhorst v. Kan. State Univ., No. 16-CV-2255-JAR-GEB, 2017 WL 3674963, at
*8 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2017).
158. See id.
159. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text.
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misconduct.160 Consequently, those policies motivated or inspired offenders
who might otherwise have been deterred had they believed the athletic
department would hold them accountable. 161
In Baylor, the court emphasized that causation is essential and the only
thing protecting institutions from “near-constant liability” whenever a
student is raped.162 But, at the same time, the court accepted as sufficient a
causal link between policies that deter reporting and the increased
likelihood of students experiencing sexual misconduct, without even
discussing whether the assailants that evaded reporting are specifically
alleged to be the same assailants that assaulted plaintiffs in the case.163 In
other words, the Baylor court accepted a version of the “culture of
tolerance” theory that the Tennessee court applied—though in the context
of an entire campus, rather than just the athletic department. 164
The Baylor court implicitly addressed one final aspect of causation
during its examination of the issue of control. Under the Gebser/Davis
160. See Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 794–800, 806 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).
161. To be sure, Tennessee was alleged to have actively contributed to the culture by
endorsing the football team’s appreciation for rap music. Id. at 793. But it’s hard to imagine
that any court interpreting Simpson to require such an active role as the role as the University
of Colorado played in constructing the environment for sexual assault would have found the
rap music nexus to be sufficient. Instead, the allegations about Tennessee’s athletic
department’s unofficial policy of failing to discipline athletes seems was arguably the
stronger contribution to the elevated risk of sexual misconduct that the plaintiffs in that case
alleged.
162. Doe 12 v. Baylor Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 763, 780 (W.D. Tex. 2018).
163. See id. at 782.
164. Id. (“Plaintiffs allege that Baylor, ‘its staff, and highest officers,’ with knowledge of
numerous and detailed reports of sexual assault, ‘maintained a set of policies, procedures,
and customs . . . that were implemented in a sexually discriminatory manner,’ and ‘permitted
a campus condition rife with sexual assault,’ that ‘substantially increased Plaintiffs’ chances
of being sexually assaulted.’”) (internal citations omitted) (quoting the Amended Complaint
(Docket No. 14)). The court then went on to provide specific examples of the policies
alleged to be deficient, but did not articulate specific connections between the policies and
the “campus condition,” or the “campus condition” and the specific threat to the plaintiffs—
allowing these obvious connections to speak for themselves. See id. at 782–83.
While this Article was in production, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar
observation about causation, reinstating plaintiff’s claim that a university’s policy of overreliance on informal resolution caused the sexual assault. The court rejected the University’s
argument that Simpson requires a program-specific theory of causation. Karasek v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 996 F.3d 1093, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020) (“But we will not foreclose the
possibility that a plaintiff could adequately allege causation even when a school’s policy of
deliberate indifference extends to sexual misconduct occurring across campus.”).
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standard, plaintiffs must allege specific facts that establish institutional
control over the assailant.165 Such controls exist either because the assailant
is a student or employee, or because the location or context where the
assault occurred was under institutional control. 166 Baylor attempted to
import this requirement to an official policy claim by arguing that the
plaintiffs did not include allegations that the university had control over the
assailants.167 The court, nonetheless, found the plaintiffs’ allegations “that
Baylor’s disciplinary measures were inadequate and intentionally
discriminatory, causing a heightened risk of sexual assault for Baylor
students” sufficient to evidence control.168 The court’s discussion
demonstrates that the Gebser/Davis inquiry into institutional control over
the assailant is not relevant in an official policy claim. 169 Instead, it is
subsumed by the element of causation: a policy that is not discriminatory or
indifferent will have materially reduced the risk of sexual assault that the
plaintiff faced.
In sum, the Baylor and Tennessee decisions illustrate the potential
breadth of official policy liability by illustrating: that policy need not be
written but proven based on the conduct of university employees; that
intentional discrimination includes indifference to a threat that is generally
understood rather than specifically predicted by past events; that the
causation inquiry is not limited to whether universities have actively and
directly caused the risk of sexual misconduct, but can also be satisfied by a
showing that the university’s policy demonstrated tolerance for sexual
misconduct within a program or within the campus as a whole; and that the
requirement for institutional control over the assailant is not a separate
requirement for liability, but part of the inquiry as to whether university
policy has the power to minimize the risk of sexual misconduct that the
plaintiff experienced.
B. Potential Applications
Under the new regulations, the Department of Education will limit
enforcement to situations that would qualify for money damages under the

165. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644–46 (1999); Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
166. Davis, 526 U.S. at 644.
167. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 781.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 781–83.
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Gebser/Davis standard.170 As previously noted, such a change is
unnecessary and unwarranted by the absence of particular fairness and
notice issues that exist when the courts are evaluating claims for money
damages by individuals who are essentially third-party beneficiaries to an
agreement between the government and the institution that conditions
federal funding on Title IX compliance.171 Lowering the regulatory standard
would likely lead to underenforcement of Title IX. It would essentially
render both courts and OCR powerless to hold institutions accountable for
sexual misconduct that does not involve the narrow range of facts that
would satisfy Gebser/Davis.
Thus, it is particularly helpful to consider alternatives to Gebser/Davis
liability. Official policy liability, as first used in Simpson and then
expansively construed in the Baylor and Tennessee cases, will help ensure
that Title IX continues to impose accountability on educational institutions
for their policies and practices regulating sexual misconduct. Specifically,
this theory of liability addresses three deficiencies in the Gebser/Davis
theory of liability: first-time perpetrators, off-campus assaults and nonstudent perpetrators, and injunction-only cases.
1. First-Time Perpetrators
Gebser/Davis liability is difficult to establish in cases where the
institution had no notice of the threat posed by the alleged perpetrator.
Generally, in such cases, the perpetrator had not offended previously or had
engaged in less serious behavior than the offense for which the plaintiff is
seeking damages. Simpson itself demonstrates the expansive potential here,
as the court concluded that liability for failing to reform its policies in
response to knowledge that the football recruiting program in general
creates a risk of sexual assault, not a risk posted by the specific recruits who
assaulted the plaintiffs in that case.172
2. Off-Campus Assaults and Non-student Perpetrators
Off-campus sexual assaults and assaults committed by non-student
perpetrators are weak candidates for Gebser/Davis liability due to the
requirement that institutions have control over the sexual assault for
liability to apply. But as the Baylor court explained, an official policy claim
does not look at whether the school had control; rather, courts will look at
170. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 16–26 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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whether the policies or customs of the university “caus[ed] a heightened
risk of sexual assault” for the university’s students. 173 As such, official
policy liability may be proper in cases where an institution successfully
defends itself under Gebser/Davis based on a lack of control over the sexual
assault.
To illustrate, imagine a university whose campus security has a policy or
practice of failing to intervene in cases where students report an on-campus
threat posed by individuals who are not affiliated with the university. 174
Imagine further that a student calls campus security to report that her
estranged partner, who is not a student, has come to campus and threatened
her; according to the student, his return is imminent. Consistent with their
policy or custom, the campus police do not intervene, and the estranged
partner commits an act of sexual violence that is within the scope of Title
IX.
Such a case would likely fall outside the scope of Gebser/Davis on the
grounds that that the university lacks control over the perpetrator.175 But the
causal nexus between the policy and the increased threat is apparent. The
university’s policy has increased the risk to the student of enduring violence
that is protected under Title IX. Moreover, due to the student’s reports, the
threat is undeniably “obvious” in a way that many or even most non-student
perpetrators would not necessarily be.
3. Injunction and Injunction-Only Cases
Beyond the ability of plaintiffs to seek damages from universities,
official policy claims premised on deficient policy or custom are good
candidates for injunctive relief. Policies involving an institution’s training,
supervision, and disciplinary responses are all potential targets for
injunctive relief for a successful claim for official policy liability. For
example, the Tennessee court allowed the plaintiffs’ action to move forward
on its claims for injunctive relief regarding the university’s failure to
discipline drinking, drug use, and sexual assault, as well as the university’s
endorsement of inappropriate parties and biased implementation of
173. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 781.
174. The hypothetical is based on McCluskey v. Utah. Complaint at 41, McCluskey v.
Utah, No. 2:19-cv-00449-HCN (D. Utah June 27, 2019).
175. See, e.g., Hall v. Millersville Univ., 400 F. Supp. 3d 252, 287–89 (E.D. Pa. 2019);
Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 3:15-CV-03717-WHO, 2018 WL 1763289, at
*12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2018); Samuelson v. Or. State Univ., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1126
(D. Or. 2016), aff’d, 725 F. App’x 598 (9th Cir. 2018).
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disciplinary proceedings. 176 The availability of judicial relief through
official policy liability to address these kinds of policy deficiencies is
particularly fitting in the wake of a new Gebser/Davis standard for
regulatory action, which could weaken the government’s oversight over
such matters.
One thing that could threaten the power of official policy liability to
enhance institutional accountability on matters of sexual misconduct is the
requirement that plaintiffs have standing to pursue the injunctive relief in
the form of prospective policy change. This is not a concern in
administrative enforcement, since standing is not required to initiate an
administrative complaint under Title IX. 177 Nor is it a problem for plaintiffs
bringing Gebser/Davis claims, as such claims allow plaintiffs to pursue
compensatory damages for injury that has already occurred.178
However, the Tennessee case provides an example of plaintiffs
surmounting this obstacle. There, the court rejected the university’s
argument that plaintiffs who had already graduated lacked standing to
pursue administrative relief. 179 The university had cited the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Williams v. University of Georgia for its argument. 180
In Williams, the plaintiff prevailed under the Gebser/Davis standard on her
claim for money damages stemming from a rape orchestrated by a studentathlete whose coach had allowed him to transfer into the school, despite the
athlete’s sexual misconduct at two prior schools. 181 Though the plaintiff
176. Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 812–14 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).
177. Diane Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education: Supreme Court to
Review Whether There is a Title IX Cause of Action by an Athletic Department Employee for
Retaliation, 194 ED. L. REP. 1, 15 (2005) (noting that the Office of Civil Rights has “allowed
individuals to file Title IX administrative complaints on behalf of student-athletes, regardless
of whether that individual would have judicial legal standing, and would accept confidential
filings”).
178. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (differentiating
between standing to pursue compensatory damages for past harm, which was assumed, and
standing to pursue injunctive relief).
179. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 813 (“The court is, however, persuaded by the
plaintiffs’ argument that, even if all of the Jane Does have permanently withdrawn from UT,
they may still have standing to pursue their claim for injunctive relief as relates to UT’s postassault practices, based on the fact that at least some of them are still involved in ongoing
proceedings (either disciplinary proceedings against their assailants or proceedings
challenging decisions about their own academic standing).”).
180. Id. at 814.
181. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1290 (11th Cir.
2007).
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prevailed under the deliberate indifference standard, the court rejected her
claim for injunctive relief because neither she nor the assailant were still
students.182
Despite the apparent similarities, the Tennessee court distinguished
Williams.183 First, it noted that, unlike the students in Williams, some of the
plaintiffs in the Tennessee case were still students at the time of
litigation. 184 Moreover, their claims alleged a widespread pattern of Title IX
violations beyond the particulars of the plaintiffs’ cases, dissimilar to the
Williams case.185 The court found that even if none of the plaintiffs were
still enrolled students, they would still have standing to pursue injunctive
relief against the university’s disciplinary policies and customs. 186 For
example, some of the plaintiffs were still involved with those disciplinary
proceedings, and some “felt forced to leave school because their assailants
ha[d] not been adequately disciplined” but wished to return to the school if
the injunctive relief was granted.187 This analysis demonstrates that
standing, while challenging to prove for student plaintiffs seeking
injunctive relief, is not an insurmountable obstacle. Therefore, while
standing must be strategically considered by attorneys while drafting
complaints, the doctrine does not necessarily undermine the viability of an
accountability strategy built on official policy liability claims.
In fact, the Tennessee court’s analysis of standing within the context of
an official policy claim raises the question of whether a student would even
need to be sexually assaulted to challenge deficient policies and practices if
they are only pursuing injunctive relief, instead of pursuing both injunctive
relief and money damages. If the plaintiff in such a case could prove that a
university’s policy or practice heightened the risk of sexual assault because
it was deficient in the face of an obvious risk, why would a sexual assault
actually need to occur? Any plaintiff who experiences that heightened risk
could arguably allege an injury sufficient to satisfy the standing
requirement. If this interpretation is true, special interest groups could
possibly seek to litigate changes to university policies that might result
from the Department of Education’s anticipated weakening of the
regulatory standard.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 1299, 1303.
Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 814.
Id. at 813–14.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 813.
Id.
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Conclusion
Though most Title IX cases challenge institutional responses to sexual
misconduct under the Gebser/Davis framework, another theory of liability
aimed at challenging discriminatory official policy already exists and has
precedent in sexual misconduct cases. As evidenced by two recent
decisions in cases involving sexual misconduct at the University of
Tennessee and Baylor University, there is potential for a more expansive
interpretation of this theory than courts have generally rendered to this
point. Whether it leads to judicial remedy or merely increases pressure on
schools to settle, official policy liability possesses untapped potential for
leveraging Title IX to hold educational institutions accountable for
instances of sexual assault and misconduct. Given that institutions may
have less to fear from the government’s enforcement after new regulatory
changes take effect, the time is ripe to raise the profile of Title IX’s theory
of official policy liability.

